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TN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK H. RYAN and EMMA JEAN
RYAN, husband and wife,
Respondents,

*
*

*
*
*
*

vs.
J. ELLIOTT EARL,
Appellant.

CASE NO. 16843

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent asserts the statement of fact as set
forth by the Appellant in -his Brief are disputed and the
following are the uncontroverted facts upon which the Court
based its findings, which facts are as follows:
1.

That the Appellant, J. Elliot Earl was a joint

tenant with Anthony

v.

Haynie, Jr. to the property described

in the said Complaint by virtue of a Warranty Deed issued to
them on March 12, 1963.
2.

That the Respondents purchased the undivided 1/2

interest of Anthony

v.

Haynie, Jr. in the said property for

the sum of $27,500.00 after he learned that Mr. Haynie was
co-tenant on the property with Mr. Earl.

Checks for payment

of the purchase price were issued and delivered to Mr.
Haynie as follows:

9-23-77
1-2-78

$ 5,000.00
$22,500.00
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3.

Deeds conveying Anthony B. Haynie's 1/2 interest in

the property to Respondents were prepared and recorded in
the office of the County Recorder, Cache County, Utah, on
March 9, 1979, and on September 17, 1979, respectfully.
4.

That Plaintiff, Jack Ryan issued checks and or paid

accounts of Appellant totaling the sum of $28,500.00 for his
1/2 interest in the property first check # 9169 dated
September 30, 1977 paid and delivered to Elliott Earl in the
amount of $5,000.00 on which check was typed the following:
$28,500.00
12,761.90 loan
s~ooo.oo check
$10,738.10 balance on land
That on or about the 15th day of November 1977, the Respondent
paid off Appellant's Earl's loan with First Federal Savings,
which loan was secured on the property involved in this suit
in the amount of $12,514.33, Defendant Earl had been paying
on this loan at the rate of $157.00 per month at 10 perent
interest.
5.

That thereafter on December 10, 1977, the

Respondents issued and delivered a check to Jay Elliott
Earl, upon which was written, "balance on land, paid in
full", (Plaintiff Exhibit 4) plus delivered to him a statement for repairs on his forklift and payment for back
water taxes on the farm.
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6.

That through an inadvertent mistake, the

Respondents deducted the foregoing payments from the sum of
$27,500.00 (See Exhibit 7) when in truth and fact it should
have been $28,500.00, was the agreed sale price.

Thereafter

when this error was discovered by Respondents, they obtained
a cashiers check for $1,000.00 payable to Jay Elliott Earl
from First Security Bank, dated March 26, 1979 was delivered
to the Respondent, together with an additional cashier's
check for the difference in the payoff of the First Federal
Savings and Loan in the amount of $247.64.

These two checks

were delivered to Plaintiff at the time demand was made upon
himn for execution of the Deed for his 1/2 interest in the
property to the Respondents.

The Appellant refused to exe-

cute the deed.
7.

Respondents on or about December 1, 1977 entered

into possession of the property, removed the Appellants personal property from the building located upon the property
and took exclusive possession thereof and immediately commenced to construct a new home on the said property.
8.

That between December 1, 1977 and April 1, 1979,

the Respondents constructed a new home on the said property,
during which time the Appellant delivered to the home, the
brick to be used in the construction of the home.

Numerous
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other visits were made by Appellant to property during the
time improvements were made thereon by Respondent, and he
took no action whatever.
9.

That at the time of entering into the possession of

the above described property, the farm was in generally rundown condition, the building was in poor condition and
repair, having broken cinder block, the doors were bent, the
oil furnace was not operating, castelite remenants stuck to
the cement floor and the roof was leaking.
10.

That the Respondents, upon entering possession of the

property, made many valuable improvements on the property,
consisting of the following to the building:

Put in new

bathroom and shower in the shop, built an office, built a
saddle room, fixed the roof, rewired the building, put new
light fixtures in the building, installed rain gutters,
installed the yard light, built butcher shop with 13Xl5
freezer, leveled around the shop, built a large sump and
filled in the various holes.
11.
the farm:

The Respondents made the following improvements to
Hired a surveyor to fix the fence line on the

South, built new fence and gates, hired a backhoe to dig an
irrigation ditch from 10th West along the South line of the
property, had LeGrand Johnson haul 60 truckloads of dirt
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from the spring area, made a new irrigation ditch to carry
the waters to the West side of the property so the same
could be properly irrigated, drained the property, dug a new
water· well for culinary use which was piped into the new
home and. the shop, plowed and leveled the North half of the
property and planted

alfalfa~

hauled numerous loads of

gravel on the road.
12.

That the Respondents paid the 1978 taxes on the said

property and that thereafter the Appellant paid the same
taxes on the said property.
13.

The following facts were controverted:

The

Respondents claim that the Appellant entered. into an oral
agr~ement

on or about September 30, 1977 to sell his 1/2

interest in the property for the sum of $28,500.00 and told
them to go ahead and pay off the loan at the First Federal
Savings and Loan as part of the consideration.

The balance

of the purchase after payment of the loan would be payable
to

the Respondents, and that when the said payment was

made, the Appellant

~efused

to sign the deed claiming that

he had never agreed to sell the property to the Respondents,
but on the alternative, wanted to have the property appraised
and partitioned.
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ARGUMENT AND LAW
POINT I
AN ORAL OR IMPLIED CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE
Contracts· are said to be either expressed or implied.
Contracts are expressed when their terms are stated by the
parties.

There are times

wh~n

c6ntracts may be implied,

when the terms are not so stated.

Thus, implied contracts

is one inferred from- the-conduct of the parties though not
expressed in words.

Implied-- contract in fact are inferred
.

-

.

from the facts and circumstances of the case and are not
formally or explicitly stated in words.

The only difference

between an'expressed contract and an implied contract is
that in the former, the parties have arrived at their
agreement by words, whether oral or written, while in the
latter, their agreement is arrived at by consideration of
their acts and conduct, arid that in both of these cases
there is iri fact a contract existing between the parties.
The only difference being the character of the evidence
necessary to establish it.

In other words, in an expressed

contract all of the terms and conditions are expressed between
the parties-while an implied contract, some one or more of
the terms and conditions may be implied from the conduct of
the parties.

An implied contract between two parties arises

when the facts are such that an intent may be
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inferred on their part to make a contract.
circumstances must taken into consideration.

All pertinent
(17 AM Jur

2d, Contracts, Section 3, pg. 335)
In 77 Am Jur 2d, pg. 617, it states that "The
Purchaser in a contract for sale and purchase
of land has several legal and equitable remedies
ag~inst the vendor when the latter ~rongfully fails
or refuses to perform his part of the contract to
conve~·to the purchas~r the kind of title which
he 1s contracted to convey. If the vendor is able
but unwilling or refuses t6.convey title to the land
as contracted to do, the vendee may proceed in equity
for specific performance". Respondents are seeking
specific performance.
77 Am.Jr 2d, Section 113 states that in order for that

person to be entitled to specific performance, must show
that the contract is fair and equitable and free from any
fraud or misrepresentation or overreaching on his part.
That the Respondents have done.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT.
IF THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT
THE SUPREME COURT ON REVIEW MUST VIEW THE SAME IN THE
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LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT
Upon review by the Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated the rule as follows:
"On Conflicting matters, evidence on appeal
is to be viewed in the light most favorable
to the part for whom the Judgment was entered
and when so viewed, if there is sufficient
competent evidence to support the judgment,
it will not be disturbed".
(See Christensen
vs. Christensen, 339 Pacific 2d 101, 103,
Staley vs. Grants, 2 Utah 2d 421, ·276 P2d 489.
and Erickson vs. Bennison, Utah 503 P2d 141.
In Ervell vs. Salt Lake City Corp. 493

P2~,

1283, 1285,

Judge Crocket made the following statement which seems to
apply to the Appellant herein when he said:
"In preface to discussion of the various
contentions of the appellant Railroads
it should be said that they have indulged
in the euphoric fallacy so common to losing
litigants: a blithe persistence in assuming
that the facts are as they desire to see
them, rather than as they were seen by the
jury. It therefore seems necessary to reiterate
the basic rule of review: that we are obliged
to survey the evidence, and all reasonable
inferences that could fairly be drawn therefrom
in the light favorable to the verdict and Judgment".
The Respondent, Ryan, recognizes that an oral
agreement must be established by clear, unequivical and
definite evidence, (See Ravill vs. Price, 123 Utah 559, 26
P2d 579.

This burden the Plaintiff assumed and proved in

this case.

The evidence provided in this case is summarized

as follows:
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1.

That prior to July 12, 1977 Jack Ryan, the

Plaintiff entered into negotiations with the Defendant,
Elliott Earl to purchase the property which is the
subject matter of the litigation (TR pp 107-21) and at
that time, the Plaintiff thought that the Defendant, Earl,
was the sole owner of the said property, (TR pp 108-23).
That on or about July 12, 1977, the Plaintiff offered to
purchase from Earl, the above described property for the sum
of $55,000.00 and issued a check of down payment in the
amount of $5,000.00, which check was held by the Defendant
and never accepted or cashed and was later returned to
Plaintiff. (TR p 108)
2.

That in subsequent negotiations, the Plaintiff learned

that the Defendant, Earl did not own the fee title of the
said property but in fact owned a 1/2 interest in the property and the other 1/2 interest was owned by Anthony B.
Haynie, Jr. (TR p 109).

That at the suggestion of the

Defendant, Earl, Mr. Ryan, on or about the 23rd day of
September, 1977, negotiated a purchase of Anthony Haynie's
1/2 interest in the property for the sum of $27,500.00 (TR pp
109-110) and (TR p 125), and received a deed from Mr. Haynie
(Exhibits 18 & 19).

The Plaintiff informed Mr. Earl that he
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had purchased Mr. Haynie's 1/2 interest for $27,500.00.
(TR p 128-5).

The Plaintiff, Mr. Ryan then made a new offer

on or about September 30, 1977 to Mr. Earl of $28,500.00 for
his 1/2 interest in the property, the same being $1,000.00
rt -

more than paid to Mr. Haynie. (TR pp 128 and 171-18). Mr.
r

1

-j

Earl

,

,

said he'd go along with this, and told Ryan to pay off

his loan at First Federal Savings (TR p 128).

Mr.

Ryan

gave Mr. Earl a check for ·d~wn p~yment of $5,000.00.
. • i "'""

128-22).
1

:

'

~

(TR pp
f .

I 1

~

(See also Plaintiff Exhibit No. 3) on which check
<

~

~ ..

r

was written the following:
$28,500.00
12, 761. 90 Loan
5,000.00
$10,738.0Q Balance on Land

. Pla:in-tiff, Mr. Ryan -the.n proceeded .to pay. off Ea.rl' s
loan at .First Federal Savings, by
$70,000.00 at First Federal,

mak~ng

a 1·loan of

(Plaintiff Exhibit No.

26)~

and

from this loan the Plaintiff paid off Earl's loan of
$12,514.33 on or about November 15,

1~77.

(Plaintiff

Exhibit No. 25)
3.

On December 10, 1977, Plaintiff delivered a check for

$9,587.01 (Plaintiff Exhibit 4) plus a paid bill for $151.09

(Plaintiff-Exhibit No. 7) for payment of back water.taxes
and some work done on Defendant's forklift.

This check-was
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given to Defendants partner, Mr. Hill at Defendant's new
place of business.

Two days later Defendant, however, told

Ryan he had received checks (TR pp 131-25) and looked over
the figures and everything seemed alright (TR 131-25)
4.

That on or about December 1, 1977, the Plaintiff

Ryan, entered into exclusive possession of the above
described property (TR pp 66-6, 238-10) and commenced to
make

valuabl~

improvement on the property to the land and

the cinder block building expending $15,000.00 to
$20,000.00, (TR 157-158) which improvements consisted of
the following:

Replacing the damaged block in front of the

door on the cinder block building, repairing the roof on
the cinder block building, rewiring the cinder block
building, installing new light fixtures, rain gutters and
yard lights on the cinder block building, installing new
motor in the furnace in the cinder block building, straightening
the overhead doors, installing the new woodburning stove,
installing the new bathroom and shower in the shop in the
cinder block building, constructing a new butcher shop which
is attached to the cinder block building, building of a
freezer in the building, leveling of the yard around the
shop, filling the holes and building a large sump for drain
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water, hiring of a surveyer to fix the property with the
~

neighbor, building a fence and gates on the property lines,
hiring a backhoe to dig an irrigation ditch to get the
waters from 10th West to the West side of the property,
construction of a drain pond with ditches for draining of
the land, digging of a new culinary water well and running
water lines into the new house and the construction of a new
home on the property (TR ,157).

Mr. Ryan also commenced

building a new home on the p~op~r~y and expended $80,000.00
'I'

'

before he ran out of money to finish the house.
5.

(TR 159).

Mr. Ryan mistakenly assumed when he paid off the

loan at First Federal Savings & Loan that the bank would
follow through and get the deed from Earl for him (TR 130-2,
See also TR 119-3).
6.

Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the property in

the Fall of 1978, (Exhibit 9)

Defendant a month later paid

the taxes on the same property.
7.

In early 1979, when Mr. Ryan learned he didn't have

the title (TR 144-5) he contacted his attorney and realized
that he owed $1,247.64 additional amount.

Plaintiff then

purchased cashier checks arid delivered them to Defendant
(Plaintiff Exhibit No. 8), and demanded a deed which the

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant refused and claimed there was no agreement to sell
his property.
After reviewing Appellant's Brief, it appears that
there is no dispute as to the law that is applicable in
this case.

The differences are one of fact.

The Defendant

claims that there is no conduct of the parties that could
be constructed as acceptance thereby creating a contract.
This is not true.

Let us summarize the evidence what this

conduct was.
1.

At TR 128-6 I asked the question ·Of Mr. Ryan about

the formation of the contract on September 30, 1977:
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

What did Elliott (Defendant) say?
Well, he says--I don't know just what he said then,
but then I told him that I'd like to buy his piece
now, so I could have it all in one piece and that
I'd give him another thousand dollars for it and he
says, "Well, that sounds pretty good." He says
that he'd go with that and we would have an
agreement on that but that it would be my ground at
twenty-eight and that the extra thousand dollars
made the difference.
$28,500.00; is that correct?
Yes, $28,500.00 and at that time is when he told me
to go up and pay the loan off and get it all
straightened around.
Did you issue a check to Mr. Earl at that time?
I gave him a chec.k for $5,000.00 and he told me at
that time, he say, "I can't cash this now on
account of my divorce trouble and the things that I
have there so I'll just have to keep it until I
find out whether I have to buy a new home or any of
these other things. So he says, "I'll just put it

-13-
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Q.

A.
Q.

A,

2.

in the drawer here until such time I can do this."
Did you ever tell him in any way that he couldn't
cash that check?
No. I told him that the check was.as good as gold.
He could cash it anytime he wanted. It would be
the sooner the better for me.
You gave him the check on September 30, Mr. Ryan,
and did you make_ an effort then to pay off the loan
at First Federal Savings?
Yes, I made arrangeme,nts to. get the money and that
there--to pay the loan off. That's when I went up
and borrowed the $70,000.DO.
In mid December 1977 Defendant told Plaintiff he'd

received the check of $9,587.01 and everything seemed
alright and he put it in the drawer because he still didn't
know how he

~as

going to come -0ut on his divorce deal.

(TR 131-25) to TR 132-4)

At

Ryan· again ·testified:

A.

Yes, at that time ·he told. me he received the check
and looked over the figures and everything and
eve~rything. seems _.to be alr_ight, and he put it in
the drawer with the other one because he still
didn '-t know just how he was going to come out on
his divorce deal and that.

3.

The Plaintiffs went into exclusive possession of

the property and moved Defendant's stuff from the building
,.

without his permission.

Defendant Earl testified as

follows: (TR 238-7)
...

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

·with regard to the situation there, isn '.t it true
that Jack took exclusive possession of the building
after he went into possession?
Without permission, yes.
And he moved all of your stuff out?
Without permission, yes. ·
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4. ·After Mr. Ryan had taken possession he started
making many improvements.

At TR 153-17 I asked Mr. Ryan

the following:
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

5.

In connection with all of these improvements was Mr.
Earl down there when you were making these improvements and saw these?
·yes. Like I said~ a number of times, one time he
come down there for a water tank and a pump and
another time he came down to get something out of
the station wagon.
At any of those occasions did he offer to give you
your check back and say that he hadn't sold the
property to you?
He never mentioned anything about any deal at all.
Other than things like it looks like you're really
changing the face of this place.
Did he ever exert any right to possession or assume
any'rights torpossession?
No, he never did. When he wanted to use any of it,
it was when he came·down with that camper and
wanted permission to keep it up there.
The Plaintiffs immediately started building a new

home on the property and spent up to $80,000.00 when their
money ran out.

(TR 159-3)

During the construction on the

home the Defendant, Mr. Earl, delivered brick for the home.
At TR 242-5 Mr. Earl testified as follows:
Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.

But during the course of construction you delivered
the brick?
Yes.
Certainly you knew there was a nice home because it
was up to square?
Sure.
Did you do anything to protect your interest in
that half of the property under that home?
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A.

I thought that until I had made some kind of a commitment that I was in the driver's seat and it
would be up to Jack to.come around and take care of
those obligations.

6.

In the Fall of 1978 almost one year after

Plaintiffs took possession the Defendant called Mr. Ryan and
asked for permission to put his camper on the property for
the winter.

Mr. Ryan testifed as follows at (TR 155-8):

A.

Well, he phoned up and my wife answered the phone.
She called me down there and he asked permission to
put his camper out there because he didn't have no
place to put it.

7.

Defendant never offered to pay for any of the

improvements (TR 163-7).

Mr. Ryan's testimony:

A.

Did he ever offer to pay you anything for any of
the improvements either to the land or building?
No.

8.

During cross examination the Defendant stated to Mr.

Q.

Ryan that he would sell for a fair pr ice, (TR 243-7) Mr. Earl' E
testimony:
Q.

A.

Isn't it true, in fact, that you told him you would
sell that property at a fair price?
Yes, I did.
See also (TR 51-8)

The testimony of Plaintiff's two appraisers, Nixon and
Balls, and the appraiser of Defendant, Tom Singleton, show
that the price offered of $28,500.00 was more than appraised
value.

See testimony of Jack Nixon and Lynn Balls and Tom

Singleton.

(TR 12 Nixon - TR 192 to 196-21 Balls)

(TR 203

to 211-15 Singleton).
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9.

After Plaintiff paid off Earl's loan at First

Federal Savings and Loan, Defendant was relieved of making
the monthly loan payment of approximately $157.00 per month
and went from November 1977 to the date of trial tw9 years
and never paid any monthly payment or interest to Mr. Ryan
(TR 64-1) •
10.

Defendant claims he was after Plaintiff to get an

agreement all through these many months.

Yet Defendant was

in contact with his attorney, Mr. Lanny Gunnell, and never made
any effort to get him

t~

make the agreement or do anything

to assert any rights to the property.

See TR 245-3 to TR

245-15)
11.

Defendant

r&cei~ed

the

ch~cks

and kept them until

the suit was commenced, when he refused to sign a deed.

I

asked Mr. Ryan the following at (TR 246-13):
Q.
A.

But you seemed intent on keeping the checks, didn't
you, which you did. You kept the checks?
Yes, I kept the checks.
Then at TR 162-5

Q.

A.

I

asked Mr. Ryan:

Between the time you gave the checks to Mr. Earl
and the time you went to get the deed signed, did
he ever of fer to return the checks to you or give
them back to you?
No.
Then I asked the following question at TR 162-21:

Q.

A.
Q.

Did, you ever, when you saw him from time to time
after you gave the checks to him, did you ask him
why he hadn't cashed the checks?
Yes, a number of times.
What did he say?
-17-
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A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Well, to start with, it was the divorce and then he
was going to buy some land and then later on he was
going to buy a diesel truck and then he was on that
land again.
At any of those occasions ,that you talked to him
about it, did he ever say he was not going to cash
those checks?
No, he never did tell me he wasn't going to cash
them.
,,
Did he ever offer to pay you anything for any of
the improvements either to the land or building?
No.

The foregoing evidence clearly supports the court's
Finding No. 4 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
The trial Court from the evidence made its Finding No.
5 which reads as follows:

(File 73-74)

"The Court finds that an oral contract
was entered into between the parties was
clear, definite and mutually understood
and .established by clear unequivical and
different testimony or other evidence
presented in the above matter. The
Court further finds that some of the
testimony was disputed, but that such
disputed testimony does not bar the
finding that the contract was
established by the evidence. The Court
finds the only dispute in the evidence
was that of a conversation of September
30, 1977. Plaintiff testified that a
contract was .formed, that the reason
the Defendant did not deposit the check
for $5,000.00 down payment, was because
of the uncertainty of a pending divorce
proceeding. The Defendant testified and
claims that.he was holding the check as
"a good faith offer". The Court determines that the testimony of the Plaintiff
-18-
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was more convincing to the Court. That
subsequent actions of the Defendant
support the Plaintiff's version of the
oral contract. The Court finds that
the Defendant never again asserted any
claims of ownership in the property from
the time he surrendered possession thereof
to the Plaintiffs, until he duplicated the
payment of the property taxes on the property
on November 30, 1978, which taxes the Defendant
paid after the Plaintiff had paid the taxes on
the said property.. That Defendant did not
store his pickup or boat on the property
after he deliv,ered possession -to the Plaintiffs,
even though he needed storage for these items,
and the Defendant made no objection to the
outside storage of his property that was
stored in the building prior to the contract.
That Defendant asked for permission from the Plaintiff, Jack Ryan, to store his camper
on the property in the fall of 1~78 1 and
allowed the Plaintiff to designate the
place for its storage. That Defendant did
not object to the payment of the morgage by
the Plaintiff, .and was relieved of making
the monthly payments thereon. That Defendant
received and kept the second check -in the sum
of $9,587.01 plus a bill marked paid without
objection until :after this suit was filed.
That Defendant unloaded brick for the Plaintiff
at the time he was constructing a new house on the
said property in Spring of 1978, at which time
the house was .up to a square without any objections being made by the Defendant. That
Defendant _al-lowed th-e ,Plaintiff to make valuable
improvements on the property as set forth in
paragraph 4 above, and the Court further finds
that in all matters, the Defendant acted as if
the property was.owned by teh Plaintiff exclusively
until after the full purchase price was tendered
to him in March of 1979, when he refused to execute
a deed to the Plaintiff. This action was then
commenced on April 12, 1979.
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POINT III
PART PERFORMANCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT REMOVES A CONTRACT
FOR SALE OF LAND FROM THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
It is clear that the-law states that part performance
on the part:of a vendee removes a contract from the sale
of land from the Statute of Frauds.
Section 25-5-8 U.C.A. 1953 provides,
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed
to abr idg~ the. pow,er of the Courts to compel the specific performance of agreemeents in case of part performance thereof".
Where there is no memorandum reduced to writing and
no writing subscribed by the parties to be charged, but the
owner had accepted the consideration and surrendered
possession, there was sufficient part performance to avoid
the

Statu~

of Frauds.

(See Henry Madsen's Estate, 259

2d 595).
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Ravarino vs.
Price, 260 2d, 579, states the general rule on part performance as follows:
I

"It is to be noted that possession by
the Plaintiff. is regarded as an important fact, one of which is generally
directly referable to a contract, and
when combined with pe_rmanent valuable
improvements which are representative
of the existance of the oral contract,
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virtually every jurisdiction grants
specific performance. The same limitation, of course, is placed on the
Plaintiffs' possession as found when
improvements are relied upon, it must
be of such a nature that it would not
have been given without the presence of
the oral contract to convey."
In the Wooley vs. Brown, 529 P 2d, 1035, appears to be
the last decision in this general area, the Utah Supreme
Court stated it could not permit a party to accept performance for many years and then claim terms contrary to the
evidence as basis to substantiate an assertion of indef inateness and thus avoid specific performance.

The conduct of

the parties is totally consistant with the existence of an
oral contract as claimed by the Plaintiff.

When

Mr. Ryan

was asked as to whether or not he would have made these
costly improvements on the property if, in fact, there had
not been a contract, he answered as
Q.

A.

follows:

(TR 250-4)

Jack, if you had had any knowledge or indication
from Mr. Earl that he would not sell his one-half
interest, would you have gone· ahead and built your
home on that property?
"No way".
After the following objection the witness then
answered: "No, I wouldn't have built anything nor
done anything. I would have grabbed my checks or
whatever and ran and wouldn't get involved in no
deals".
(See TR 250-13)

The Utah Supreme Court discusses at length the part
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performance Ravarino vs. Price Utah 260 P 2d, 570 where at
page 578 it states:
"In order that a Plaintiff may be permitted
give evidence of a contract not in writing, and
which is in the very teeth of the statute and
nullity at law, is essential that he establish
(in equity) by clear and positive proof, acts
and things done in pursuance and on account
thereof, exclusively referable thereto, which
will take it out of the operation of the statute."
The Utah Court, at page 579 states:
"It is to be noted that possession by the
Plaintiff is regarded as an improtant fact,
one which is generally directly referable to
a contract, and when combined with permanent
and valuable improvements which are representative of the existance of an oral cbntract,
virtually every jurisdiction will grant
specific performance. The same limitation,
of course, is placed on the Plaintiff's
possession as is found when improvementsare relied upon: it must be of such a
nature that it would not have been gi~en
without the presence of an oral contact
to convey."
The Utah Court went on and held in the Ravino case that
the Plaintiff in that case did not acquire possession of the
property owned by the Defendant.
before the Court.

This is not the case

In Ravarino vs. Price the

Utah Supreme

Court states that the grantor of the "Terry Strip" had no
interest in Defendant's property, and therefore, possession
of the "Terry Strip" could not be possession of Defendant's
property.
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'The facts of the Ravarino case are not the same as our
case.

There are basic principles discussed in the Ravarino

case which are applicable in our case.

In our

case there

is no question that the Plaintiffs went into possession of
the property owned by the Defendant.

This possession

coupled with the making of substantial valuable improvements
constitute sufficient part performance and

would work a

substantial hardship and injustice if the specific performance was not granted.
The Defendant cites Christensen vs. Christensen, Utah
339 P2d ld4.

The Plaintiff agrees with the principals

stated in this case.

The Plaintiff asserts that the

contract was definite, clear and unambiguous.

The sale

price for the Defendant's interest in the property was
$28,500.00 to be paid in cash.

That upon payment of the

cash, the Defendant was to deliver a Deed to the property.
The date of possession was established by the Plaintiff
going into possession in December of 1977.
The Defendant argues that the possession of one cotenant is for the benefit of all co-tenants. This might be
true if possession was all that was involved. But we have
substantial improvements coupled with possession based upon
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an oral contract.

It seems completely illogical for the

Defendant to assert his position when substantial valuable
improvements were made upon the property by the Plaintiffs
when he made no objection or did nothing.

These improve-

ments would not have been made if there had not been an oral
contract.

No person

in their right mind is going to enter

upon the property of another and build a new home and other
improvements upon the property at a cost of exceeding
$100,000.00

when they did not have reason to believe that

there was an oral contract to convey the property.
Defendant argues that the improvements made upon the
property by a co-tenant are for the benefit of the co-tenant
not adverse to them.

The evidence before the Court, show

the home that was build by Mr. Ryan upon the property for his
family.
home?

Is Mr. Earl claiming rights to 1/2 interest in the
Certainly such reasoning is inconceivable.

The

nature of the improvements made upon the property by the
Plaintiff are completely inconsistent with a tenant in common situation.

The nature of the improvements made and the

extent thereof was for the Plaintiff's own use and benefit
and not for Mr.

Earls benefit.

Earl from the property.

Plaintiffs had ousted Mr.

Notice that Plaintiffs were

claiming the property adverse to Defendant is shown by the
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fact of the building of the new home on the property.

The

action of the Plaintiff's right~ clearly show Plaintiffs
were acting adverse to Defendant's rights.
In light of the foregoing it is clear that the evidence
supports by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of
a contract.

The part performance by the Plaintiff herein,

required.the Court to enter its Order of Specific
Performance under the rules announced in the Ravarino vs.
Price case Supra.
In the case of Woolsey vs. Brown 539 P2d 1035, appears
to be the last Utah decision in this general area, and the
Court in that case, states:
" Equity will not permit a party to accept
performance for many years and then claim
terms contrary to the evidence as a basis
to substantiate an assertion of indef inateness
and thus avoids specific performance."
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it is clear that the evidence supports the findings of contract to sell and convey the property to the Plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs have met their bur-

den by clear and convincing evidence.
lized the evidence correctly.
cation of a contract here.

The trial Court ana-

There is no attempted fabri-

Plaintiff is entitled to a

decree of Specific Performance and the judgment of the trial
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Court should be affirmed.

/~
day of April, 1980.
,

Respectfully submitted this
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